Power, Sovereignty, and Selective Enforcement: U.S.–Israel–Iran Tensions and the Structural Crisis of the International Legal Order

Abstract

Escalating tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran represent one of the most consequential geopolitical fault lines in the contemporary international system. While open interstate war has thus far been avoided, the persistent cycle of targeted strikes, proxy engagements, economic sanctions, cyber operations, and diplomatic confrontation has raised fundamental questions concerning the legality and legitimacy of the use of force under international law. This article provides a comprehensive academic analysis of the structural and normative dimensions of these tensions. It evaluates the prohibition of force under the Charter of the United Nations, the evolving doctrine of self-defense, the role of the United Nations Security Council, and the perception of selective enforcement in the global legal order. Drawing from international legal theory, political realism, liberal institutionalism, and Just War Theory, this study argues that the U.S.–Israel–Iran confrontation reflects a deeper structural tension between normative aspirations of a rules-based order and the enduring realities of power asymmetry. The article concludes that the credibility of international law depends not solely on textual rules but on consistent application and political commitment among major powers.

1. Introduction

The geopolitical triangle formed by the United States, Israel, and Iran constitutes one of the most persistent and volatile axes in contemporary global politics. Unlike conventional interstate wars of the twentieth century, the confrontation among these actors is characterized by ambiguity, indirect engagements, cyber operations, intelligence activities, targeted military strikes, and economic sanctions rather than formal declarations of war.

Each episode of escalation triggers a familiar set of questions:

Do targeted strikes constitute lawful self-defense?
Does economic coercion violate sovereignty?
Are cyber operations equivalent to armed attacks?
Why do international institutions appear constrained?
Why do many states respond cautiously rather than decisively?

These questions are not merely regional; they concern the stability of the post-1945 international legal order. The prohibition on the use of force, codified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, is widely regarded as a foundational norm of modern international law (Shaw, 2017). Yet practice demonstrates that its interpretation remains contested.

This article argues that the tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran expose structural contradictions embedded within the international system itself. These contradictions involve the relationship between sovereignty and security, law and power, enforcement and legitimacy.

2. Historical Evolution of the U.S.–Israel–Iran Confrontation

2.1 From Strategic Partnership to Hostility

Prior to 1979, Iran under the Shah maintained close relations with both the United States and Israel. The Iranian Revolution transformed this geopolitical alignment. Diplomatic rupture between Washington and Tehran, coupled with ideological opposition, produced a protracted adversarial relationship.

Israel, meanwhile, recalibrated its strategic doctrine to address regional shifts. Iranian political rhetoric and support for armed non-state actors in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza have been interpreted by Israeli policymakers as direct threats to national security.

2.2 Indirect Confrontation and Proxy Arenas

Rather than open war, the confrontation operates across multiple theaters:

Syria (airstrikes targeting alleged strategic assets)
Lebanon (Hezbollah-related tensions)
Iraq (militia activity)
Maritime incidents in the Gulf
Cyber operations targeting infrastructure

This pattern reflects the transformation of conflict in the twenty-first century, where hybrid warfare blurs distinctions between war and peace (Schmitt, 2017).

3. The Normative Core: Prohibition of the Use of Force

3.1 Article 2(4) and Its Significance

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits states from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. This rule emerged from the catastrophic experiences of two world wars. It represents an attempt to constitutionalize international relations.

Legal scholars describe it as a jus cogens norm—one from which no derogation is permitted (Gray, 2018).

However, the rule is not absolute.

3.2 Self-Defense Under Article 51

Article 51 preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. The interpretative controversy lies in defining:

What qualifies as an “armed attack”?
What level of imminence justifies anticipatory action?
How proportional must the response be?

The International Court of Justice has traditionally adopted a restrictive interpretation, emphasizing gravity thresholds. Yet state practice demonstrates broader interpretations in certain contexts.

4. Preemptive and Preventive Self-Defense in Contemporary Practice

The distinction between preemptive and preventive self-defense is critical.

Preemptive self-defense addresses imminent attack.
Preventive self-defense addresses potential future threats.

The Caroline doctrine requires necessity and immediacy (Dinstein, 2017). However, missile technology, cyber capabilities, and clandestine operations complicate traditional temporal assessments.

In the U.S.–Israel–Iran context, policymakers often invoke anticipatory self-defense arguments based on intelligence assessments regarding strategic threats. Critics caution that expanding preventive doctrines risks undermining the entire prohibition framework.

If preventive logic becomes normalized, Article 2(4) risks erosion.

5. Sovereignty Versus Security: The Structural Dilemma

International law is built upon sovereign equality. Yet the security dilemma, as described by Jervis (1978), explains how defensive measures by one state may appear offensive to another.

Iran’s nuclear development has been defended domestically as peaceful and sovereign. Israel and the United States, however, have viewed potential weaponization as existential or regional threats.

This dynamic creates a cycle:

One state enhances capabilities.
Another perceives threat.
Defensive countermeasures escalate tensions.

Sovereignty thus collides with security imperatives.

6. The Role and Limits of the United Nations

6.1 Veto Power and Institutional Paralysis

The Security Council’s five permanent members possess veto authority. This mechanism prevents enforcement action against major powers without their consent (Hurd, 2007).

In conflicts involving strategic allies or permanent members themselves, resolutions may be blocked. This structural design often produces perceptions of selective enforcement.

Yet the UN cannot act independently of its members. Its authority is derivative, not autonomous.

6.2 General Assembly and Symbolic Authority

The General Assembly can pass resolutions expressing concern or condemnation, but these are non-binding. Thus, legal authority and political feasibility often diverge.

7. Economic Sanctions and International Legality

Economic sanctions have become a primary instrument in U.S.–Iran relations. Sanctions aim to alter state behavior without resorting to kinetic force.

Under international law, sanctions may constitute lawful countermeasures if responding to prior internationally wrongful acts (Drezner, 2011). However, comprehensive sanctions may raise humanitarian concerns.

Critics argue that broad economic restrictions can disproportionately affect civilians, raising ethical questions even when legally justified.

8. Cyber Operations and the Gray Zone of Conflict

Cyber operations represent a frontier challenge. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides interpretive guidance but lacks binding authority (Schmitt, 2017).

Key questions include:

Does cyber sabotage qualify as an armed attack?
What level of physical or economic damage triggers Article 51?
How should attribution be established?

In the absence of clear consensus, states operate within interpretive flexibility.

9. Perceived Selective Enforcement and Legitimacy Crisis

The perception that international law is applied inconsistently has significant implications.

Realist scholars argue that powerful states inevitably shape norms to serve interests (Mearsheimer, 2001). Institutionalists counter that legitimacy constraints still influence behavior (Keohane, 1984).

Selective enforcement perceptions do not necessarily imply conspiracy or systemic bias; they reflect structural asymmetry in enforcement capacity.

Legitimacy erosion, however, can reduce voluntary compliance across the system.

10. Ethical Framework: Just War Theory Revisited

Even where legal arguments exist, moral evaluation remains necessary.

Just War criteria include:

Just cause
Legitimate authority
Last resort
Proportionality
Civilian protection

Targeted strikes may satisfy narrow military objectives but still raise ethical concerns regarding escalation risks.

Ethical analysis thus complements legal scrutiny.

11. Nuclear Diplomacy and the JCPOA

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015) sought to limit enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. Its partial collapse reintroduced uncertainty.

Diplomacy, when functional, reduces security dilemmas. When diplomacy falters, states may revert to unilateral measures.

The fragility of nuclear agreements illustrates how international law depends on sustained political commitment.

12. International Courts and Accountability Mechanisms

The International Court of Justice and other judicial bodies provide dispute resolution mechanisms. However, jurisdiction depends on state consent.

Major powers may decline compulsory jurisdiction, limiting enforcement.

This reflects a broader truth: international law lacks centralized coercive power comparable to domestic systems.

13. Why Do Many States Respond Cautiously?

Perceived silence often reflects:

Strategic balancing
Economic interdependence
Regional stability concerns
Legal ambiguity
Diplomatic pragmatism

States operate within complex cost-benefit calculations. Public condemnation may not align with strategic interests.

Silence does not necessarily equal endorsement.

14. Reform Debates and Structural Evolution

Scholars propose:

Security Council expansion
Veto limitation in mass atrocity cases
Clearer definitions of imminence
Stronger compliance monitoring

However, reform requires consent from those who benefit from current arrangements.

Incremental adaptation is more plausible than radical restructuring.

15. Discussion: Between Normative Aspiration and Political Reality

The U.S.–Israel–Iran confrontation reveals systemic tension between normative aspiration and political realism. International law remains influential but constrained. It shapes discourse, reputational costs, alliance behavior, and diplomatic negotiation—even when enforcement is inconsistent.

The system is neither purely legalistic nor purely anarchic. It is a hybrid order.

16. Conclusion

The tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran illustrate deeper structural contradictions within the contemporary international system. The prohibition on the use of force remains foundational, yet its interpretation is contested in contexts involving anticipatory defense, hybrid warfare, and nuclear proliferation.

The United Nations operates within institutional limits defined by power distribution. Perceptions of selective enforcement reflect structural asymmetries rather than singular geopolitical narratives.

Ultimately, the durability of the international legal order depends on consistent application of norms and renewed commitment by major powers to multilateral solutions. Without such commitment, legitimacy erosion may gradually weaken the normative foundations established after 1945.

International law cannot eliminate power politics. But it can constrain, shape, and moderate it—provided that states are willing to treat law not merely as rhetoric, but as binding principle.

References

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